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Swords into Ploughshares: Why the
United States Should Provide Refuge to
Young Men who Refuse to Bear Arms
for Reasons of Conscience
KAREN MUSALO*
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the 1980 Refugee Act1 to bring the United
States into compliance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees,2 and with the United Nations Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees,3 which is incorporated by
reference into the Protocol. The Refugee Act adopted the definition
* Clinical Assistant Professor of Law, University of San Francisco. J.D. 1981,
Boalt Hall School of Law; B.A. 1973, Brooklyn College. I gratefully acknowledge Tanya
Broder for her research assistance and critical reading, and Jennifer Moore for her valu-
able suggestions and encouragement in the writing of this article.
I. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 [hereinafter 1980 Act or
Refugee Act] (amending Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 101(a)(42), 207-09,
243(h), 411-14) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1 101(a)(42), 1157-59, 1253(h), 1521-24 (1982)
[hereinafter INA]). The Refugee Act provides for two forms of relief, political asylum
pursuant to section 101(a)(42), and withholding of deportation pursuant to section
243(h). Political asylum relief is within the discretionary authority of the attorney gen-
eral for individuals who meet the refugee definition; withholding of deportation is a
mandatory form of relief available to individuals who establish that their "life or freedom
would be threatened. . .on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a partic-
ular social group or political opinion" upon return to their home country. INA § 243(h),
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h).
2. Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinaf-
ter Protocol].
3. 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (1951) [hereinafter Convention].
4. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987). ("If one thing is clear
from the legislative history of the new definition of 'refugee' and indeed the entire 1980
Act, it is that one of Congress' primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law
into conformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol. . . ."); H.R. REP. No. 781,
of refugee contained in the Protocol:
any person who is outside of such person's nationality or, in the case of a
person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person
last habitually resided, and who is unable to avail himself or herself of the
protection of that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group, or political opinion.5
Since the Refugee Act's passage, the courts have been called upon
to resolve controversies over almost every aspect of the refugee defi-
nition. The Immigration and Naturalization Service consistently has
argued for interpretations of the Act which increase the asylum ap-
plicants' burden of proof,6 or which limit those categories of individ-
uals which can come within its protection. The Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals (Board) 7 has generally upheld the INS, but the federal
courts have frequently reversed Board decisions. 8
One such category of individuals which the Board deems to be
outside the protection of the Refugee Act is the "conscientious objec-
tor," the young man10 who flees his home country rather than be
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
160; S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 141, 144; H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1979).
5. INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982).
6. See, e.g., Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 452 (rejecting the Immigration and
Naturalization Service's contention that applicants for political asylum must show a clear
probability of persecution, which is the standard for withholding of deportation, rather
than the more generous well-founded fear standard). In his concurrence to this decision,
Justice Blackmun rebuked the Immigration and Naturalization Service for their "seem-
ingly purposeful blindness" in developing the standards for relief under the 1980 Refugee
Act. id.
7. The Board of Immigration Appeals has nationwide jurisdiction over appeals of
decisions of immigration judges in deportation and exclusion proceedings. 8 C.F.R. §
3.1(b)(l), (2) (1988).
8. See, e.g., Blanco-Lopez v. INS, 858 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1988) (reversing Board
of Immigration Appeals' holding that beatings and death threats against a Salvadoran
accused of gun-running did not constitute persecution); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767
F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1985) (reversing Board of Immigration Appeals' holding that an
alien who suffered a direct credible threat against his life on account of his desire to
remain neutral was not eligible for relief); Dwomoh v. Sava, 696 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (reversing Board of Immigration Appeals' holding that a coup participant in
Ghana who had been tortured and imprisoned was not eligible for relief).
9, The definition of conscientious objector in the context of this article is somewhat
broader than the definition under United States law. Under the laws of the United
States, conscientious objection may be based on religious, moral, or ethical beliefs, and
the objection must extend to participation in all wars; selective conscientious objection is
not recognized as a basis for exemption from military service. Military Selective Service
Act § 6(j), 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 4560) (West 1981); 32 C.F.R. §§ 1636.3-1636.6 (1980);
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965). The definition of conscientious objection in this article is derived from the
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER ON REFUGEES; HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS (1979) [hereinafter HANDBOOK] and
other international sources. An objection may be based on political convictions, as well as
religious, moral, or ethical beliefs. The objection need not extend to all wars, but may be
based upon particular wars or military actions.
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forced to join the military and participate in activities in violation of
his religious, moral, or political convictions. In In re Canas,11 de-
cided in September of 1988, the Board held that relief under the
1980 Refugee Act is not available to such individuals.12
The Board's position on the issue of conscientious objection as a
valid basis for refugee status runs counter to the guidance of the
United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees in the Handbook
on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status,3
which recommends refugee status for such individuals. 4 Although
the Handbook is not binding, it is recognized by United States
courts as an internationally respected instrument for interpreting the
Protocol.' 5 According to the Handbook, punishment of an individual
who, for reasons of conscience, refuses to perform military service
constitutes persecution within the meaning of the Protocol.
The position of the Board also diverges from developing asylum
jurisprudence. Federal courts have recognized an expanded concept
of the term "persecution."' 6 Recent decisions demonstrate a willing-
ness to reject a narrow analysis of the required "on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or po-
litical opinion" in favor of an interpretation which looks at the total-
ity of circumstances. 17
This article will address the issue of the conscientious objector as
refugee from the perspective of the advocate. It will argue that ful-
fillment of the letter and spirit of the Refugee Act requires the pro-
10. To date all of the cases under the Refugee Act have involved young men; the
descriptive use of this term is not meant to exclude persons of any age or gender who
may be subject to obligatory mandatory service.
I. Interim Dec. No. 3074 (BIA 1988).
12. In re Canas is currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The
author is attorney of record for the respondents in In re Canas.
13. HANDBOOK, supra note 9.
14. Id. 11 167-74.
15. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 (1987) ("the Handbook
provides significant guidance in construing the Protocol, to which Congress sought to
conform").
16. See Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir. 1985), afT d, INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) ("the statutory term 'persecution' includes
more than just restrictions on life and liberty"); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d
1277, 1283 n.13 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[f]urthermore, the term 'persecution' in section 101
may not be limited to 'a threat to life or freedom' ").
17. See, e.g., Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1988) (beatings, imprison-
ment, and assaults for refusing to pay bribes to Haitian paramilitary forces constitutes
persecution on account of political opinion); Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th
Cir. 1987) (repeated rape and beating of a female Salvadoran civilian by an Air Force
sergeant constitutes persecution on account of political opinion).
tection of young men of conscience. The article will first briefly re-.
view those sections of the Handbook that deal with conscientious
objectors and will examine federal and Board precedent. It will then
look at the Board of Immigration Appeals' rationale in denying relief
to such persons. The article will then respond to the Board's reason-
ing, drawing upon the Protocol, the Handbook, the 1980 Refugee
Act, and relevant domestic precedent. It will consider the signifi-
cance of the developing international trend toward recognition of
conscientious objection as a fundamental human right. Finally, the
article will address itself to the practical concerns of the practitioner
advocating on behalf of Salvadoran and Guatemalan clients through
a discussion of the factual requirements for raising a claim based on
objection to military service for reasons of conscience.
II. THE UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK
The Handbook recommends refugee status for individuals who
flee their home countries to avoid serving in the military against
their "genuine political, religious or moral convictions, or. . .valid
reasons of conscience."' 8 Although the Handbook is not binding, it
"provides significant guidance in construing the Protocol, to which
Congress sought to conform."' 19 The Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established by the
United Nations General Assembly20 and charged with the "duty of
supervising the application of the provisions" of the Protocol.2' The
UNHCR prepared the Handbook at the request of member states
for their guidance in applying the Protocol.2 The criteria articulated
in the Handbook for determining refugee status are the preduct of
knowledge accumulated by the UNHCR over a twenty-five year pe-
riod. It has been widely circulated and approved by governments.23
18. HANDBOOK, supra note 9, % 170; see also 11 171-74.
19. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 439 n.22; see also authorities cited supra note
4.
20. The United Nations General Assembly established the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on January 1, 1951. G.A. Res. 319A, U.N.
Doc. A/1251, at 36 (1949); G.A. Res. 428, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 46, U.N.
Doc. A/1775 (1951).
21. See Protocol, supra note 2, art. II, T 1.
The State Parties to the present Protocol undertake to co-operate with the Of-
fice of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other
agency of the United Nations which may succeed it, in the exercise of its func-
tions, and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of
the provisions of the present Protocol.
Id.
22. Report of the 28th Session for the Executive Comm. of the High Commis-
sioner's Programme, UN Doc. A/AC.96/549 at I 53.6(g) (1977).
23. Report of the 30th Session for the Executive Comm. of the High Commis-
sioner's Programme, UN Doc. A/AC.96/572 at 68, 72(a)(h) (1979); Report of the 31st
Session for the Executive Comm. of the High Commissioner's Programme, UN Doc. A/
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By acceding to the Protocol, the United States agreed to cooperate
with the UNHCR in its supervision of the Protocol's application.2 4
The federal courts2 5 and the Board of Immigration Appeals26 have
deferred consistently to the Handbook's guidance in interpreting the
1980 Refugee Act.
The Handbook's recommendation of refugee status for conscien-
tious objectors constitutes an exception to the well-established princi-
AC.96/588 at 36 (1980).
24. See Protocol, supra note 2, art. II.
25. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (applying Handbook's in-
terpretation of "well-founded" fear of persecution); Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396 (9th
Cir. 1987) (applying Handbook to evaluate petitioner's credibility); Ramirez-Ramos v.
INS, 814 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying Handbook to find that provision regarding
crimes committed outside the United States does not apply to crimes committed within
the United States); Cerrillo-Perez v. INS, 809 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1987) (under the
Handbook, preservation of family unity is a critical factor in admitting refugees);
Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1575 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Handbook provi-
sion regarding membership in a "social group"); Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509,
513, 516 n.6, 517 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying Handbook provisions regarding relevant
facts to consider in determining: reasonable possibility of persecution; group determina-
tion of refugee status; and imputed political opinion); Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766
F.2d 621 (lst Cir. 1985) (applying Handbook provisions on the definition of "social
group," the significance of threats to members of a social group, and the weight of an
applicant's personal testimony); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir.
1985) (significance of credible testimony); Young v. INS, 759 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1985)(dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 996 (1985) (citing Handbook for significance
of credible testimony); Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing
Handbook provisions on the evidentiary burden for proving a "well-founded fear");
Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1984) (significance of credible testimony);Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 407
(1984) (applying Handbook definition of "well-founded fear" of persecution); McMullen
v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981) (refugees fleeing persecution are often limited in
the evidence they can present); Dwomoh v. Sava, 696 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)(applying the Handbook provisions on convictions for serious nonpolitical crimes); Singh
v. Nelson, 623 F. Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (petitioners fleeing persecution are limited
in the evidence that they can present); Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union v. Smith,
594 F. Supp. 502 (D.D.C. 1984), ajffd, 804 F.2d 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1986), affd as
amended, 846 F.2d 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (the UNHCR Handbook is the
"basic guide" in analyzing the term "well-founded fear"); Ellis v. Ferro, 549 F. Supp.
428 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (development of the proper legal standards for consideration of
asylum claims is to be informed by the traditional indices of legislative intent, and by the
Handbook).
26. See In re Vigil, Interim Dec. No. 3050 (BIA 1988) (citing Handbook provi-
sions on draft resisters); In re Maldonado-Cruz, Interim Dec. No. 3041 (BIA 1988),
rev'd, 883 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Handbook provisions on draft resisters and
on the "legitimate" use of force by the police and armed forces); In re A-G, Interim Dec.
No. 3040 (BIA 1987) (citing Handbook provisions on draft resisters); In re Acosta, In-
terim Dec. No. 2986 (BIA 1985) (applying Handbook's provisions on the well-founded
fear of persecution); In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244 (BIA 1982) (citing Handbook
definition of a "serious non-political crime"); In re Rodriquez-Palma, 17 I. & N. Dec.
465 (BIA 1980) (applying Handbook provision on serious nonpolitical crimes).
pie that sovereign nations have the right to raise and maintain ar-
mies,27 and therefore prosecution and punishment for the criminal
offense of draft evasion or desertion does not constitute persecution
within the meaning of the 1980 Refugee Act.28
The Handbook position is consistent with this general principle,29
27. Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 1988) (referring to the "legiti-
mate authority to raise armies" possessed by national sovereigns); In re Vigil, Interim
Dec. No. 3050, at 9 (BIA 1988) (referring to the "long established principle of interna-
tional law that a sovereign government has the right to draft its citizens and maintain an
army for the purpose of self-defense"); see also Conscientious Objection to Military Ser-
vice, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2, at 14, U.N. Sales No. E.85.XIV.I (1985) ("[u]nder
international law and practice every nation may be said to have the right to organize its
defence forces").
28. Rodriquez-Rivera v. INS, 848 F.2d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 1988) ("requiring mil-
itary service does not constitute persecution"); Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1232 (9th
Cir. 1988) ("[Ihis court has rejected persecution claims based on the threat of conscrip-
tion into a national army"); Kaveh-Haghigy v. INS, 783 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1986);
Saballo-Cortez v. INS, 761 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1985); Espinoza-Martinez v. INS, 754
F.2d 1536 (9th Cir. 1985); Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.,2d 139 (3rd Cir. 1982); Batistic v.
Pilliod, 286 F.2d 1961 (7th Cir. 1961) (refusal to serve in Yugoslavian military insuffi-
cient to qualify applicant for withholding of deportation); Chao-Ling Wang v. Pilliod,
285 F.2d 517, 520 (7th Cir. 1960) ("prosecution before a military tribunal convened
pursuant to laws of a foreign state to try offenses committed by a member of the military
forces of that country, cannot be construed to be physical persecution under the stat-
ute"); Villegas v. O'Neill, 626 F. Supp. 1241 (S.D. Tex. 1986); Glavic v. Beechie, 225 F.
Supp. 24, 27 (S.D. Tex. 1963), afr'd, 340 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1964) (refusal to serve in the
Yugoslavian Army not "the sort of persecution which has been held to justify parole");
In re Vigil, Interim Dec. No. 3050, at 10 (BIA 1988) ("We have consistently taken the
position that a government's drafting a person for military service does not constitute
'persecution,' and that a person who fears returning to a given country only because of a
prior unwillingness to perform military service there has not demonstrated eligibility for
asylum."); In re A-G-, Interim Dec. No. 3040, at 6 (BIA 1987) ("We hold to the long-
accepted position that it is not persecution for a country to require military service of its
citizens."); In re Lee, 13 I. & N. Dec. 236 (BIA 1969); In re Liao, I1 I. & N. Dec. 113
(BIA 1965).
The foregoing is consistent with the axiom that prosecution for a crime is generally not
considered to be persecution: "Persecution must be distinguished from punishment for a
common law offence. Persons fleeing from prosecution or punishment for such an offence
are not normally refugees. It should be recalled that a refugee is a victim-or a potential
victim--of injustice, not a fugitive from justice." HANDBOOK, supra note 9, % 57; see
also MacCaud v. INS, 500 F.2d 355 (2nd Cir. 1974) (Canadian petitioner who feared
prosecution and punishment for the crime of escape from prison while serving a sentence
for the possession of counterfeit banknotes not eligible for withholding of deportation).
29. HANDBOOK, supra note 9, % 167-68:
167. In countries where military service is compulsory, failure to perform this
duty is frequently punishable by law. Moreover, whether military service is
compulsory or not, desertion is invariably considered a criminal offence. The
penalties may vary from country to country, and are not normally regarded as
persecution. Fear of prosecution and punishment for desertion or draft-evasion
does not in itself constitute well-founded fear of persecution under the defini-
tion. Desertion or draft evasion, does not, on the other hand, exclude a person
from being a refugee, and a person may be a refugee in addition to being a
deserter or draft-evader.
168, A person is clearly not a refugee if his only reason for desertion or
draft-evasion is his dislike of military service or fear of combat. He may,
however, be a refugee if his desertion or evasion of military service is concomi-
tant with other relevant motives for leaving or remaining outside his country,
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but carves out two basic exceptions. The first applies when the draft
evader or deserter suffers disproportionately severe punishment for
the offense on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion,
or membership in a particular social group.30 The second exception
applies when the individual's refusal to serve in the military is based
on "genuine political, religious or moral convictions, or. . .valid rea-
sons of conscience." 3' 1
or if he otherwise has reasons, within the meaning of the definition, to fear
persecution.
Id. (emphasis added).
30. HANDBOOK, supra note 9, 169:
169. A deserter or draft-evader may also be considered a refugee if it can be
shown that he would suffer disproportionately severe punishment for the mili-
tary offence on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a par-
ticular social group or political opinion. The same would apply if it can be
shown that he has well-founded fear of persecution on these grounds above and
beyond the punishment for desertion.
Id. (emphasis added).
31. HANDBOOK, supra note 9, 1 170-73:
170. There are, however, also cases where the necessity to perform military
service may be the sole ground for a claim to refugee status, i.e. when a person
can show that the performance of military service would have required his par-
ticipation in military action contrary to his genuine political, religious or moral
convictions, or to valid reasons of conscience.
171. Not every conviction, genuine though it may be, will constitute a suffi-
cient reason for claiming refugee status after desertion or draft-evasion. It is
not enough for a person to be in disagreement with his government regarding
the political justification for particular military action. Where, however, the
type of military action, with which an individual does not wish to be associated,
is condemned by the international community as contrary to basic rules of
human conduct, punishment for desertion or draft-evasion could, in light of all
other requirements of the definition, in itself be regarded as persecution.
172. Refusal to perform military service may also be based on religious con-
victions. If an applicant is able to show that his religious convictions are genu-
ine, and that such convictions are not taken into account by the authorities of
his country in requiring him to perform military service, he may be able to
establish a claim to refugee status. Such a claim would, of course, be supported
by any additional indications that the applicant or his family may have encoun-
tered difficulties due to their religious convictions.
173. The question as to whether objection to performing military service for
reasons of conscience can give rise to a valid claim to refugee status should also
be considered in the light of more recent developments in this field. An increas-
ing number of States have introduced legislation or administrative regulations
whereby persons who can invoke genuine reasons of conscience are exempted
from military service, either entirely or subject to their performing alternative
(i.e. civilian) service. The introduction of such legislation or administrative reg-
ulations has also been the subject of recommendations by international agen-
cies. In the light of these developments, it would be open to Contracting States,
to grant refugee status to persons who object to performing military service for
genuine reasons of conscience.
Id.
In the first exception, involving disproportionate punishment, the
government's otherwise permissible motive of punishing an individ-
ual for the criminal offense of draft evasion or desertion is called into
question by its discriminatory application of the punishment. The
government's more severe punishment of an individual because of his
race, religion, nationality, social group membership, or political opin-
ion may transform the punishment into persecution.3 2 The second ex-
ception, which addresses conscientious objectors and is the focus of
this article, is based upon the rationale that to punish an individual
for adhering to his religious or political convictions is to persecute
the individual.
The Handbook's recommendation is based upon a distinction be-
tween the individual who refuses military service for reasons of con-
science and the individual who refuses for reasons of self-interest or
expediency. The state's right to obligate its citizens to perform mili-
tary service33 must be balanced against the rights of the individual.
The right to refuse military service for reasons of conscience is enti-
tled to deference. Thus, when the individual's refusal is not based on
reasons of conscience, the state's interest in maintaining its defense
generally prevails. However, the balance is quite different when the
state's right is weighed against the competing interest that both the
individual and society have in the cultivation and preservation of the
individual conscience. 4 In such a case, the state's interest cannot be
32. The Handbook and federal precedent recognize that the line between prosecu-
tion and persecution is not clear. HANDBOOK, supra note 9, % 57 ("The. . .distinction
[between prosecution and persecution] may, however, occasionally be obscured."). Prose-
cution may constitute persecution when the punishment is imposed against an individual
for an action or status which is protected within the refugee definition, or when the pun-
ishment is excessive. Id. Prosecution may also constitute persecution when the crime or
the punishment is politically motivated, Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1977);
In re Janus & Janek, 12 I.& N. Dec. 866 (BIA 1968), or when there is no indication of
legitimate judicial process, Blanco-Lopez v. INS, 858 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1988).
33. See supra note 27.
34. Justice Harlan F. Stone declared:
All our history gives confirmation to the view that liberty of conscience has a
moral and social value which makes it worthy of preservation at the hands of
the state. So deep in its significance and vital, indeed, is it to the integrity of
man's moral and spiritual nature that nothing short of the self-preservation of
the state should warrant its violation; and it may well be questioned whether
the state which preserves its life by a settled policy of violation of the con-
science of the individual will not in fact ultimately lose it by the process.
Stone, The Conscientious Objector, 21 COL. U.Q. 253 (1919).
A similar sentiment was expressed in a United Nations report addressing the issue of
conscientious objection:
The conscience of the individual is a precious asset for every society. It is part
of the socialization process to nurture and encourage the moral conscience of
the individual, without which civilization would be meaningless. At the centre
of this process is the effort to instill in the individual the conviction that it is
immoral in most circumstances to take the life of other persons.
Conscientious Objection to Military Service, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/1983/30/
Rev.l, at 3 (1985).
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presumed to take precedence; policy then dictates an accommoda-
tion of the two opposing interests.
The increasing trend toward recognition of conscientious objection
as a fundamental human right (which is discussed in Section V)
lends further moral justification to the individual asserting this right.
It bolsters the Handbook's position that protection should be ex-
tended to the individual who is not accorded the right to conscien-
tious objection from military service in his home country 3 5
Individuals who base their claim for asylum on their refusal to
perform military service must demonstrate that their convictions are
genuine, and that these convictions "are not taken into account by
the authorities of. . . [their home] country." For instance, where
conscientious objectors are 'not released or exempted from service be-
cause of their convictions, and are instead punished, such punish-
ment constitutes persecution. The UNHCR has indicated that a
claim to asylum based on conscientious objector status may be estab-
lished especially where the punishment is "significant," 3 although
that term has not been fully defined. The individual whose refusal to
serve is based on political convictions must establish one additional
criteria: namely that the military action with which he does not
want to associate himself is "condemned by the international com-
munity as contrary to basic rules of human conduct. 3 7 Proof that
the military action contravenes human rights norms transforms the
objection from one based on mere political disagreement to one
based on international standards, which require abstention from par-
ticipation in acts of genocide and other gross violations of human
rights.3 8
In recommending refugee status for conscientious objectors, the
35. HANDBOOK, supra note 9, 1 170-73.
36. "UNHCR takes the view. . .that, especially where no alternative to military
service exists, significant punishment for refusal to perform military service, based on
strong religious or moral convictions, or on political opinion, may be considered persecu-
tion." Letter from Joachim Henkel, former Deputy Representative of the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to Karen Musalo (Jan. 30, 1986).
37. See HANDBOOK, supra note 9, 1 171. A United Nations General Assembly
resolution addressing the question of obligatory military service in South Africa is a use-
ful example of implementation of the principle contained in the Handbook. The resolu-
tion, which predated publication of the Handbook, recognizes the right of South African
citizens to refuse to serve in the armed forces of that country which enforce apartheid,
and calls upon member states to grant safe transit and asylum to those fleeing South
Africa for this reason. G.A. Res. 33/165, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 154, U.N.
Doc. A/33/45 (1979).
38. TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILI-
TARY TRIBUNAL 173-74 (1947).
Handbook characterizes the judicially sanctioned punishment which
the individual faces as persecution. In countries where human rights
are routinely violated, the individual who refuses military service is
often subject to extrajudicial sanctions, such as torture, disappear-
ance, or assassination. The refusal to serve is commonly interpreted
as a sign of disloyalty or opposition to the government.39 The imposi-
tion of such extrajudicial sanctions for draft evasion or desertion
constitutes persecution40 on account of political opinion 41 for both
conscientious objectors, and nonconscientious objectors. If the likeli-
hood of such harm could be established, it would provide a basis for
the relief of withholding of deportation as well as political asylum.
The problem lies in establishing the requisite probability that extra-
judicial sanctions will be imposed. Military and paramilitary forces
that carry out such abuses are not likely to admit having such a
policy. 42 The Board has consistently ruled inadequate the evidence
submitted by draft resisters or draft evaders to establish extrajudi-
cial sanctions.43 This article, however, will focus on the recommenda-
tion contained in Handbook paragraphs 170 through 173. Under
these provisions, a showing of extrajudicial sanctions is not neces-
sary; judicially imposed sanctions alone may constitute persecution
and form the basis for relief.
39. See, e.g., Aviles-Torres v. INS, 790 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1986) (Salvado-
ran petitioner eligible for relief because "[ildentification as a subversive, combined with
refusal to join in the armed forces would place [him] in a group of prime targets for
government retribution").
40. It is generally accepted that torture, disappearance, or assassination which im-
plicate the loss of life or freedom, constitute persecution. See, e.g., HANDBOOK, supra
note 9, 51 ("it may be inferred that a threat to life or freedom. . .is always
persecution").
41. The concept of imputed political opinion has been recognized in the Ninth Cir-
cuit and refers to persecution inflicted on an individual due to the government's percep-
tion of that individual's political opinions. Such persecution is on account of political
opinion even though the individual may be neutral or hold no political opinions whatso-
ever. See Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985); Bolanos-Hernandez v.
INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1985); Argueta v. INS, 759 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1985).
But see In re Maldonado-Cruz, Interim Dec. No. 3041 (BIA 1988) (characterizing the
harm of assassination that an individual who deserted from the guerrillas faces as mili-
tary discipline rather than persecution on account of imputed political opinion), rev'd,
883 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989).
42. See Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1285 ("Persecutors are hardly likely to
provide their victims with affidavits attesting to their acts of persecution.").
43. In re A-G-, Interim Dec. No. 3040 (BIA 1987) stated:
The respondent further asserts that the penalty for failure to serve in the mili-
tary is not imprisonment after trial but is likely to be torture and death at the
hands of the death squads. Although he has presented evidence to show that
many have been murdered by so-called death squads for suspected anti-govern-
ment sympathies, he has not supported the contention that mere failure to
serve in the military is the kind of activity which draws the attention of the
persons who carry out these killings.
id. at 7.
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III. DRAFT EVADERS, DESERTERS, AND "CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTORS": ANALYSIS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND FEDERAL COURT
DECISIONS
The only federal court decision which directly addressed the appli-
cability of the Handbook in the cases of draft evaders and resisters
was vacated upon the granting of a petition for rehearing en banc."
Thus, there are no existing federal court decisions which discuss the
applicability of Handbook paragraphs 167 through 174 in the case
of young men who base their claim for asylum on the refusal to per-
form military service. However, several cases tend to affirm the
Handbook's recommendation of asylum for such individuals .4  No
federal court has rejected the principles expressed therein. Decisions
of the Board of Immigration Appeals have been more numerous, and
extremely inconsistent. In several cases the Board granted political
asylum and withholding of deportation to draft evaders or deserters
without referring to the Handbook, or providing a clear rationale for
its decision. 6 On other occasions, the Board expressly deferred to
the Handbook, or specifically applied the relevant provisions.4 7 In
other instances, the Board declared that it would not utilize the
Handbook in making eligibility determinations in the cases of draft
evaders and deserters.4 8 The following section reviews these federal
and administrative decisions.
A. Federal Precedent
Sarkis v. Nelson49 and Sarkis v. Sava5" are the first federal court
cases apparently utilizing the Handbook's criteria on draft evaders
44. See M.A. A.26851062 v. INS, 858 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1988), reh'g en banc
granted, 866 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1989). The rehearing en banc was granted to review two
separate and distinct issues: the proper legal standard to apply to draft resisters who seek
refugee status, and the degree of deference owed by the federal courts to the Board in
cases involving motions to reopen, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 209.11 (1988).
45. See Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1988); Sarkis v. Sava, 599 F.
Supp. 724 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Sarkis v. Nelson, 585 F. Supp. 235 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
46. In re Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311 (BIA 1982); In re Momen, BIA unpublished
dec., File No. A27 026 208 (argued Oct. 10, 1985); In re Noory, BIA unpublished dec.,
File No. A24 001 415 (argued Oct. 28, 1985).
47. In re Vigil, Interim Dec. No. 3050 (BIA 1988); In re A-G-, Interim Dec. No.
3040 (BIA 1987); In re Navas-Rivera, BIA unpublished dec., File No. A24 344 885
(decided Jan. 1988).
48. In re Canas, Interim Dec. No. 3074 (BIA 1988); In re Lainez-Lainez, BIA
unpublished dec., File No. A24 349 722 (argued July 25, 1985).
49. 585 F. Supp 235 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
50. 599 F. Supp 724 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
and deserters in adjudicating claims for relief arising out of the 1980
Refugee Act. These related cases involved the asylum claims of two
Armenian Christians who feared returning to Iraq due, in part, to
their refusal to join the military. The federal court remanded the
case, instructing the Board to determine whether "performance of
military service would be contrary to [the petitioners'] genuine polit-
ical, religious, or moral convictions, or contrary to valid reasons of
conscience. ' '5 ' The individuals subsequently failed to "demonstrate,
or even to allege that military service would be contrary to their po-
litical, religious, or moral convictions" and relief was denied.52 The
court in the two Sarkis cases did not make specific reference to the
Handbook, nor did it explicitly discuss conscientious objection as a
basis for relief. However, from the court's verbatim use of the Hand-
book criteria, one can infer the incorporation of the criteria into the
adjudication of the claim.53
Although it deals primarily with forcible conscription at the hands
of the guerrillas, and not by the government, Arteaga v. INS54 con-
tains an explicit reference to the concept of conscientious objection
as a basis of asylum. The Salvadoran petitioner, Manuel Diaz
Arteaga, feared forcible conscription by the guerrillas. The Ninth
Circuit held that a nongovernmental group such as the guerrillas
does not have the right to raise armies and that such forcible con-
scription by the guerrillas constitutes a deprivation of liberty which
would amount to persecution under the statute.5 5 Governmental
groups, the court held, have the "legitimate authority to raise armies
by conscription" and therefore "this court has rejected persecution
claims based on the threat of conscription into a national army (as
51. Nelson, 585 F. Supp. at 239-40.
52. Sava, 599 F. Supp. at 726-27.
53. A recent unpublished opinion from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals simi-
larly remanded a case to the BIA for consideration of the Handbook criteria. Sanchez-
Perdomo v. INS, No. 88-4765 (5th Cir. 1989). The petitioner claimed that forced mili-
tary service in El Salvador would be in violation of his political and moral beliefs. Both
the immigration judge and the Board had treated the claim as based on mere fear of
conscription, rather than an unwillingness to serve based on personal convictions. The
court declared:
Petitioner's testimony indicated his personal opposition to the actions of the
Salvadoran military. He expressed his desire to avoid participation in the kill-
ings and other human rights abuses. Petitioner testified that if he returned to
El Salvador, he would probably be conscripted into the army and commanded
to do things he opposed. His theory of eligibility for asylum, then, was not
merely that he would be drafted into the military, but that he would be ordered
to commit acts violating his political and moral beliefs.
Id. at 3-4.
54. 836 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1988).
55. Id. at 1231-32 ("Because Arteaga's neutral political opinion precluded his vol-
untarily joining the guerrillas, the guerrillas would have had to kidnap him to get him
into their ranks. Such a deprivation of liberty on account of political opinion would
amount to persecution.").
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distinct from punishment for conscientious objection from military
service). 56 Without referring expressly to the Handbook, Arteaga
appears fo follow its principles in separating claims based on consci-
entious objection from claims based merely on a refusal to serve in
the military.
B. The Board of Immigration Appeals
In re Salim,57 which involved a national of Afghanistan who fled
after refusing to join the Afghan Army, was the first case subsequent
to the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act in which the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals considered a claim for asylum and withholding of
deportation based on refusal to serve in the military. The Board held
that because of the high level of desertion from the Afghan Army,
and the brutal method of recruitment used to replenish the ranks,
Salim's claim was "clearly differ[ent] from persecution claims by
aliens who merely seek to avoid military service in their country." 8
There is no mention of the Handbook, or any discussion of whether
the military action in Afghanistan is "condemned by the interna-
tional community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct" as
required under Handbook paragraph 171. The Board did not more
fully elucidate its rationale when it granted relief twice more to na-
tionals of Afghanistan who fled to avoid military service.59 Subse-
quently, in In re A-G-,60 the Board held that the determinative factor
in In re Salim was that the army in which Salim did not want to
56. Id. at 1232 (emphasis added).
57. 18 I. & N. Dec. 311 (BIA 1982).
58. Id. at 313.
59. In re Noory, BIA unpublished dec., File No. A24 081 415 (argued Oct. 28,
1985); In re Momen, BIA unpublished dec., File No. A27 026 208 (argued Oct. 10,
1985). The immigration judge (IJ) in In re Noory had denied the Respondent's applica-
tion for political asylum, stating that his only fear upon return to Afghanistan was re-
cruitment. Without explanation, however, the IJ granted the relief of withholding of de-
portation. The Board upheld the grant of withholding, but reversed the I's denial of
political asylum, finding that there were no negative discretionary factors warranting de-
nial of that relief. The applicant in In re Momen had entered on a false Pakistani pass-
port. He alleged that he and his family were active in the opposition Mujahidin Party
and that his brother, father, and uncle had been killed by the Afghan government. Fur-
ther, he alleged that anti-Soviet literature was found in his home by the government, and
that he hid in the mountains for three years. The IJ found him not credible and denied
asylum, but granted withholding, noting that he was granting relief due to the possibility
of the applicant's conscription into the Afghan Army. The BIA denied asylum as a mat-
ter of discretion, noting the use of the false passport, but affirmed the grant of withhold-
ing, indicating that the relief is "based solely on the applicant's assertion that he will be
conscripted into the Afghan Army if returned to that country." Id. at 3.
60. Interim Dec. No. 3040 (BIA 1987).
serve was Soviet controlled.6' The basis for the Board's reliance upon
the ideological identity of the military is suspect, since the 1980 Ref-
ugee Act was intended to eliminate geographical considerations, and
to effectuate a country-neutral standard. 2
After In re Salim, the Board directly addressed the applicability
of the Handbook provisions on draft evaders and deserters on at
least five occasions in cases involving Salvadoran and Guatemalan
applicants.13 The Board appeared to take to heart the counsel of
Ralph Waldo Emerson that "consistency is the hobgoblin of little
minds. '6 4 The Board was consistent in only one respect-its denial
of relief in all cases.
The first of these cases decided by the Board was In re Lainez-
Lainez, 5 involving a Salvadoran national. Audelino Lainez-Lainez
fled El Salvador at the age of eighteen, after being advised by a
family friend in the military that he was soon to be recruited. He
was informed after his departure that the military had come looking
for him. Lainez-Lainez testified that performance of military service
was against his political and moral convictions, because the Army
killed innocent and defenseless people.6 He feared that he too would
be killed for his refusal to participate in these activities. The Immi-
gration Judge denied relief, holding inter alia that "the obligation to
perform military service or the consequences from the refusal to per-
61. Id. at 7 ("The case of the claimant in Matter of Salim... is distinguishable
from that of the respondent because the former was refusing to serve, not in an army
controlled by his own government, but in one which was 'under Soviet command.' ").
62. Prior to the passage of the Refugee Act, recognition as a refugee was condi-
tioned on geographical and ideological factors. The first permanent statutory basis for
the admission of refugees was established by the Immigration and Nationality Act
Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-239, 79 Stat. 911. Section 203(a)(7) allowed for
the conditional entry of refugees who "because of persecution or fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, or political opinion... have fled (1) from any Communist or
Communist-dominated country or area, or (2) from any country within the general area
of the Middle East." Passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, which incorporated the interna-
tional definition of refugee, eliminated this geographical and ideological preference. See
Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of
1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 11, 17-18 (1981).
63. The applicants in two of the cases based their refusal to serve on political and
moral convictions. See In re A-G-, Interim Dec. No. 3040 (BIA 1987); In re Lainez-
Lainez, BIA unpublished dec., File No. A24 349 722 (argued July 25, 1985). The appli-
cants in two other cases based their refusal to serve on genuine religious convictions. See
In re Canas, Interim Dec. No. 3074 (BIA 1988); In re Navas-Rivera, BIA unpublished
dec., File No. A24 344 885 (decided Jan. 1988). The applicant in In re Vigil alleged that
he wanted to remain neutral, but did not raise reasons of conscience as the basis for his
refusal to serve in the military. Interim Dec. No. 3050 (BIA 1988).
64. R. W. EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYs 27, 33 (1895).
65. BIA unpublished dec., File No. A24 349 722 (argued July 25, 1985).
66. The petitioner testified from his personal knowledge of atrocities; he was
deeply disturbed upon seeing that innocent and defenseless people were often the victims
of the military: "I'm not afraid [to fight]. But I don't want to kill people that are de-
fenseless. . . .[The armed forces] don't sometimes kill the people they are going for.
They kill other innocent people. . . ." Lainez-Lainez, transcript of hearing, at 31-33.
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form such duties do not constitute persecution within the meaning of
the Act.' 67 In denying the claim, the Board affirmed the immigra-
tion judge's holding, and expressly declined to follow the Hand-
book's recommendation in this matter: "We do not agree that the
Handbook is authority for the determination of refugee status.""8
An appeal of the Board's decision is currently pending at the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Board next considered In re A-G-, 69 which raised issues sub-
stantially similar to those raised in In re Lainez-Lainez. The appli-
cant in In re A-G-, a Salvadoran national, asserted that participation
in the military violated his political and moral convictions. Like
Lainez-Lainez, A-G- had personal knowledge of atrocities commit-
ted by the military; his cousin had been killed after participating in
an antigovernment demonstration, and his brother-in-law's brother
was killed for providing food to the guerrillas. A-G- himself had
been beaten twice by the National Guard.7 0 In addition, he submit-
ted extensive evidence documenting the military's pattern of human
rights abuses against civilians. 1
Instead of dismissing the Handbook, as it had done in Lainez-
Lainez, the Board embraced it, citing to pages thirty-nine through
forty-one (the section on deserters.and persons avoiding military ser-
vice) and quoting from paragraph 171. The Board noted that the
Handbook sets forth exceptions to the "long-accepted position that it
is not persecution for a country to require military service of its citi-
67. Lainez-Lainez, BIA unpublished dec., File No. A24 349 722, at 4 (Mar. 5,
1986).
68. The Board stated:
The respondent also submits that the Handbook is authority for determining
refugee status and proceeds to indicate how he established entitlement to the
relief under its guidelines. We do not agree that the Handbook is authority for
the determination of refugee status. The Handbook is the product of the Office
of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. The preface to the
Handbook indicates that it was designed for the guidance of government offi-
cials-it does not purport to be mandatory authority. . . . Eligibility for asy-
lum and withholding of deportation is determined under the applicable provi-
sions of the Immigration and Nationality Act by this Board and the courts of
the United States. Although the Handbook may be referred to for guidance in
particular instances, it is not mandatory authority.
Id. at 6.
69. Interim Dec. No. 3040 (BIA 1987).
70. Id. at 2-3.
71. Id. at 3. The evidence submitted by the respondent included reports by Am-
nesty International and Americas Watch, affidavits of expert witnesses, and national
newspaper articles. M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 858 F.2d 210, 217 (4th Cir. 1988), reh'g
en banc granted, 866 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1989).
zens. ' 7 2 The two exceptions which the Board deemed relevant to A-
G-'s claim were "where a disproportionately severe punishment
would result on account of one of the five grounds enumerated in
section 101(a) (42) (A) of the Act, 3 or where the alien would neces-
sarily be required to engage in inhuman conduct as a result of mili-
tary service required by the government. '74 The Board held that the
applicant had failed to establish that he would suffer disproportion-
ate punishment. Then, in addressing the claim of the objection based
on political convictions, the Board declared that to show "condemna-
tion by the international community," an individual must present a
United Nations Resolution to that effect, analogous to the United
Nations Resolution addressing South Africa.75
In re A-G- is important for its recognition of the Handbook's au-
thority in cases involving draft resisters. However, the Board's inter-
pretation of the controlling Handbook language to require a United
Nations Resolution to demonstrate "condemnation by the interna-
tional community" may be critiqued for imposing an inappropriately
high standard. 6
The applicant in In re Navas-Rivera,77 a Guatemalan national,
based his claim for relief on a combination of factors, including his
fear of military recruitment.7 8 Navas-Rivera was a member of the
Seventh Day Adventist faith, and had been in seminary in prepara-
tion for the ministry. His religious beliefs as a Seventh Day Advent-
ist did not permit him to perform combatant military service."
72. In re A-G-, Interim Dec. 3040, at 6.
73. As discussed supra at text accompanying notes 30-32, a showing of dispropor-
tionate punishment may result in refugee status for both conscientious objectors and non-
conscientious objectors.
74. As discussed supra, at text accompanying notes 37-38, this is the requirement
for the person basing his objection on political convictions.
75. See supra note 37.
76. The status of the Board's decision in In re A-G- is uncertain. As discussed
infra in Section IV, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Board in M.A.
A26851062 v. INS, 858 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1988). Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit
decision was vacated after granting of the government's motion for rehearing en banc.
M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 866 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1989).
77. BIA unpublished dec., File No. A24 344 885 (decided Jan. 1988).
78. In addition to the conscientious objection aspect of his claim, the applicant
feared persecution because his father, formerly a prominent member of a far-right wing
party, was accused of participating in a kidnapping for ransom. The father had been
beaten and, at the time of the applicant's deportation hearing, was still imprisoned as a
political prisoner. Navas-Rivera allegedly was fired from a government job because of his
relationship with his father, and the family farm was taken away. In addition, Navas-
Rivera alleged that his family received anonymous telephone threats, and was constantly
being watched. Id. at 2-3.
79. The following represents the official position of the Seventh Day Adventists
regarding military service:
Throughout their history Seventh-day Adventists have been noncombatants.
They declared this position during the Civil War. They have reaffirmed it re-
peatedly through succeeding years. Government recognition of the Seventh-day
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Navas-Rivera testified that in 1975, at the age of seventeen, he was
given a deferment from combat position by the Guatemalan Army in
accommodation of his religious beliefs. He testified that he subse-
quently learned from friends that "the military no longer honors spe-
cial arrangements for religious beliefs and that he would be obli-
gated to carry arms."80 In 1983, he received a notice to report for
military service, and, believing that he would be assigned to combat-
ant service, he did not report. He feared both judicial and extrajudi-
cial sanctions for his failure to report. Although it denied relief to
Navas-Rivera, the Board's majority opinion accepted the premise
that punishment for refusal to serve in the military could form the
basis for a claim to refugee status.81 However, the Board held that
the applicant had failed to establish that he would not again be per-
mitted to serve in a noncombatant position.82
In In re Vigil,83 the Board again deferred to the authority of the
Handbook in adjudicating a claim based on a refusal to perform
military service. The applicant in In re Vigil had not alleged that his
Adventist Church as a noncombatant religious organization also dates back to
Civil War days. This status has been granted them in the armed conflicts in
which our nation has been involved since that time.
NATIONAL SERVICE ORGANIZATION OF THE GENERAL CONFERENCE OF SEVENTH-DAY
ADVENTISTS, WHY SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS ARE NONCOMBATANTS, Washington,
D.C., Oct. 11, 1943).
80. BIA unpublished dec., File No. A24 344 885, at 3 (decided Jan. 1988).
81. In its majority opinion the Board stated:
With regard to the respondent's claim that he will be persecuted because of his
failure to show up at his military interview, we initially note that the failure of
a government to honor conscientious objectors and punishment for any subse-
quent refusal to serve in the military, is not persecution in and of itself. Punish-
ment for failing to serve in the military is not persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion, so long as the punishment is not greater than what the country imposes on
anyone who fails to serve. However, if the punishment arises only because of
refusal to serve based on one of the statutorily designated grounds, or if pun-
ishment is enhanced for such a reason, a claim of persecution may arise; such
facts. are not alleged in this case. The respondent failed to present any evi-
dence to prove that the military will force him to carry arms against his reli-
gious beliefs. The respondent was allowed to serve as a medical cadet previ-
ously and he has failed to demonstrate that the military will no longer accept
such an arrangement.
Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
82. In an unpublished decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
Board's factual finding, and thus did not reach the issue of conscientious objection as a
basis for relief. Navas-Rivera v. INS, No. 88-7266, slip. op. at 4 (9th Cir. July 6, 1989)
("The BIA's conclusion that petitioner 'failed to present any evidence to prove that the
military will force him to carry arms against his religious beliefs'. . .is supported by
substantial evidence.").
83. Interim Dec. No. 3050 (BIA 1988).
service in the Salvadoran Army offended his conscience or convic-
tions; he had stated only that he feared the possibility of being con-
scripted by the army, 4 and he wished to remain neutral. 85 Under
these circumstances, Handbook paragraph 169 recommends relief
only if the punishment of disproportionate. The Board applied this
criterion and denied relief, finding that the record did not demon-
strate the application of disproportionate punishment.86
In In re Canas,s7 the Board retreated from the position articulated
in In re A-G-, In re Navas-Rivera, and In re Vigil. In those cases the
Board expressly recognized that the Handbook informed its adjudi-
cation of draft resistance claims and applied the Handbook's rele-
vant provisions. In In re Canas the Board rejected the Handbook
and declined to apply its recommendations.
The two petitioners in In re Canas refused to serve in the Salvado-
ran military because their religious beliefs as Jehovah's Witnesses
precluded both combatant and noncombatant participation.88 The
Immigration Judge and the Board found the two men to be sincere
adherents to the Jehovah's Witness faith, and held that their reli-
gious convictions were genuine.8 9 The evidence submitted established
that military service is obligatory for all men from ages eighteen to
thirty"° and that there are no exemptions for reasons of conscience.91
Those who resist or evade service are treated as deserters, and dur-
ing wartime may be imprisoned from five to fifteen years, depending
84. Id. at 4.
85. Id. at 6.
86. Id. at 10.
87. Interim Dec. No. 3074 (BIA 1988).
83. The official position of the Jehovah's Witnesses regarding military service is as
follows:
Jehovah's Witnesses are conscientiously opposed to war and to their participa-
tion in such in any form whatsoever. For this reason they inform officials of the
government that they conscientiously object to serving in the military, in any
substitute service therefor or in any civilian capacity which fosters or supports
the military ...
THE NATIONAL INTERRELIGIOUS SERVICE BOARD FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS,
WORDS OF CONSCIENCE. RELIGIOUS STATEMENTS ON CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 115
(10th ed. 1983).
89. Interim Dec. No. 3074 at 3, 9.
90. "Military service is mandatory for all Salvadorans between eighteen and thirty
years of age. In case of need, all Salvadorans suitable for performance of military tasks
shall be soldiers. A special law shall regulate this matter." CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUB-
LICA DE EL SALVADOR 1983 Y REGLAMENTO DE LA ASAMBLEA LEGISLATIVA art. 215 (El
Sal.).
91. Interim Dec. No. 3074, at 9; see Letter from Gisela von Muhlenbrock, Senior
Specialist, Library of Congress Law Library, to Leonard Rosenberg, Assistant District
Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service (Jan. 29, 1986) ("Salvadoran laws on
conscription do not include conscientious objection as an exemption for military service
nor do they include procedures to obtain such status or alternative service as a noncom-
batant or civilian."); see also Conscientious Objection to Military Service, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/SUB.2, at 23, 26, 28 (1983).
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on the circumstances.92 Arguably, a consistent application of Hand-
book paragraph 172 would have resulted in recognition of the appli-
cants as refugees. The Board, however, refused to defer to the Hand-
book's terms and assessed the claim separately under the 1980
Refugee Act. Therein, the Board found no basis for relief and held
that the harm feared by the Canas brothers for refusal to perform
military service does not constitute persecution on account of religion
under the 1980 Refugee Act.
In re Canas93 and In re A-G-94 are both published opinions, bind-
ing immigration judges nationwide,95 and severely limiting the cir-
cumstances under which young men who refuse military service for
reasons of conscience may qualify for refugee status. They are par-
ticularly troublesome because they indicate a lack of consistency on
the part of the Board of Immigration Appeals, and demonstrate a
narrow mechanistic analysis which does not comport with fundamen-
tal principles embodied in the 1980 Refugee Act. The following sec-
tion reviews in detail these two decisions and attempts to formulate a
reasoned response to the Board's position.
IV. RESPONDING To THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS:
IN RE A-G-, IN RE CANAS
A. In re A-G-
In In re A-G-, the Board accepted the applicability of the Hand-
book but denied relief. Although the Board agreed that refusal to
serve in the military may form the basis for relief if the military
action has been condemned by the international community, the
92. CODIGO DE JUSTICIA MILITARY LEY DE PROCEDIMIENTOS PENALES APLI-
CABLES AL SUSPENDERSE LAS GARANTIAS CONSTITUCIONALES (The Code of Military Jus-
tice and the Law of Criminal Procedures Applicable Upon the Suspension of Constitu-
tional Guarantees) arts. 137-39 (El Sal.).
93. Interim Dec. No. 3074 (BIA 1988).
94. Interim Dec. No. 3040 (BIA 1987).
95. For a discussion of the weight accorded to published decisions, see Comment,
A Refugee by Any Other Name: An Examination of the Board of Immigration Appeals'
Actions in Asylum Cases, 75 VA. L. REV. 681 (1989).
The vast majority of Board decisions are not published and are given no prece-
dential weight-that is, they are not binding on the INS or the immigrationjudges beyond the immediate controversy-and the Board does not cite previ-
ous unpublished decisions as authority in its opinions. The Board selects a
small number of opinions (an average of thirty per year during the last six
years) to be published as "precedent decisions," which are binding on both the
INS and the immigration judges and are frequently cited by the Board and
even the federal courts.
Id. at 685 (footnotes omitted).
Board interpreted the relevant section of the Handbook to impose
three additional requirements: a United Nations Resolution con-
demning the military action; a showing that the human rights abuses
are the policy of the Salvadoran government; and a showing that the
respondent would personally be required to carry out these abuses.
The Board's decision was appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals. The Fourth Circuit reversed the Board and found that the
petitioner had established a prima facie case for relief. Subsequently
the government brought a motion for rehearing en banc; this motion
was granted, vacating the panel's decisionY8 Although M.A. v. INS
is no longer of precedential value, its analysis is instructive. The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the basic premise that
punishment for refusal to serve with a military that engages in inter-
nationally condemned acts can form the basis for a successful re-
quest for political asylum.97 The court went on to reprimand the
Board for imposing the three additional requirements.
First, the court rejected the requisite of a United Nations Resolu-
tion condemning the military action of the Salvadoran government.
The court reasoned that the Geneva Conventions of 194998 constitute
an invaluable set of standards for assessing the actions of a military
during war, and that the evidence submitted by the petitioner
showed consistent contravention of these rules by the government of
El Salvador.9
Relying on established asylum jurisprudence, which recognizes
that a claim for relief may be based upon fear of persecution by
96. M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 858 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1988), reh'g en banc granted,
866 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1989).
97. M.A. A26851062, 858 F.2d at 215-16.
98. The United States is a party to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Conven-
tion for the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Ge-
neva Convention I), 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 73 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Member of the
Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva Convention II), 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Con-
vention II), 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75
U.N.T.S. 267 (Geneva Convention IV). President Eisenhower ratified the conventions
following the Senate's unanimous consent. 101 CONG. REc. 9958-73 (1956). The Con-
ventions entered into force on January 14, 1956, and remain in force at the present time.
99. The court stated:
The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 represent the international con-
sensus regarding minimum standards of conduct during wartime. They include
the following, as to all of which M.A. has presented evidence to show their
contravention by the Salvadoran military: the obligation to treat humanely per-
sons taking no active part in hostilities, and the prohibition of certain acts,
including violence to life and person, specifically murder of all kinds, mutila-
tion, cruel treatment, and torture; and the passing of sentences and the carry-
ing out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court.
M.A. A26851062, 858 F.2d at 219.
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groups a government cannot or will not control, the court set aside
the BIA's requirement that the commission of human rights viola-
tions be the result of government policy.100
Finally, the court held that the petitioner need not show that he
would personally be forced to commit these acts since the focus of
the Handbook is on "association" with such activities, and not com-
mission. The court noted that when the violations are pervasive, as
they are in El Salvador, there is a greater likelihood that the individ-
ual will be personally forced to participate in their commission.
The Fourth Circuit's position is appropriate, and consistent with
the language of the Handbook and with concepts generally applica-
ble to asylum jurisprudence. The Handbook itself contains no re-
quir&ment of proof of personal participation in the commission of
human rights abuses. To the contrary, the objector need only show
that he sincerely "does not wish to be associated" 101 with this type of
activity. Similarly, there is no mention of the requirement of a
United Nations Resolution; in fact, in a letter predating the decision
in In re A-G-, the former deputy counsel for the UNHCR specifi-
cally stated that "it is not an absolute prerequisite-even though it is
clearly most useful-that there exist specific condemnation of that
military action by the international community," and that it is suffi-
cient that "the military action under consideration violates interna-
tional humanitarian law (the laws of war), or that the military forces
in which he is resisting service are violating internationally recog-
nized human rights.' 0 2
100. The court declared:
We also decline to adopt the Board's requirement that there be proof that the
acts of atrocity with which M.A. does not want to be associated are the policies
of the Salvadoran government. It is sufficient that M.A. show that the Salvado-
ran government is unwilling or unable to control the offending group, here, the
armed forces. See Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1434 (9 Cir.1987
[sic]) (persecution found by a single member of the armed forces, which the
Duarte government cannot control "despite the staunchest efforts..." pro-
vided basis for well-founded fear); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d at
1284 (applicant for asylum must show "persecution by the government or by a
group which the government is unable to control."); see also McMullen v.
INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1315 n.2 (9 Cir.1981 [sic]) (in § 243(h) proceeding per-
secution includes persecution by nongovernmental groups which the govern-
ment is unable or unwilling to control).
Id. at 218. The Fourth Circuit's position is supported by the Handbook (it provides that
nongovernmental acts "can be considered as persecution if they are knowingly tolerated
by the authorities, or if the authorities refuse, or prove unable, to offer effective protec-
tion."). HANDBOOK, supra note 9, % 65.
101. HANDBOOK, supra note 9, t 171.
102. Letter from Joachim Henkel, former Deputy Representative of the UNHCR,
The requirements imposed by the Board in In re A-G- thwart the
intent implicit in Handbook paragraph 171: an intent to provide in-
ternational protection to individuals of conscience who would refrain
from the commission of acts by their government which contravene
human rights norms. Paragraph 171 must certainly be read as an
expression of the wisdom acquired through the tragic experience of
World War II. It articulates the principle, now accepted by civilized
nations, that individuals are obligated to abstain from participation
in acts of genocide and other gross violations of human rights.103 Na-
tions cannot decry war crimes and acts of genocide on the one hand,
and yet deny protection to those individuals who make a choice of
conscience to refuse association with the commission of such acts.
United States courts have held that individuals are personally re-
sponsible for taking part in actions contrary to international law,0
that is, human rights abuses which constitute violations of interna-
tional instruments. These concepts have been incorporated into our
1980 Refugee Act; it excludes from the refugee definition "any indi-
vidual who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the
persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."1 05
Such individuals are also barred from the relief of withholding of
deportation. 06 Direct, personal participation in the persecutory acts
is not necessary for a finding that an individual assisted in the perse-
cution of others. 07 Furthermore, the fact that an individual was co-
to Karen Musalo (Jan. 30, 1986).
103. TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILI-
TARY TRIBUNAL 173-74 (1947); see also Conscientious Objection to Military Service,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/30/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.85.XIV.1, at 6 (1983)
("The Nurnberg principles, contained in the Charter of Nurnberg Tribunal, and reaf-
firmed in General Assembly resolution 95(I) of 11 December 1946, make the individual
personally responsible for certain actions contrary to international law, whether or not he
has taken part in the decision-making process.").
104. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
105. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982 & Supp. 1988).
106. INA § 243(h)2, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1988).
The exclusion language of INA § 101(a)(42) and INA § 243(h)(2) is derived from,
and is almost identical to, the language contained in INA § 241(a)(19), 8 U.S.C.A. §
1251(a)(19). This statute mandates deportation of any alien who:
[D]uring the period beginning on March 23, 1933, and ending on May 8, 1945,
under the direction of or in association with
(a) The Nazi government of Germany,(b) any government in any area occupied by the military forces of the Nazi
government of Germany,
(c) any government established with the assistance or cooperation of the
Nazi government of Germany,(d) any government which was an ally of the Nazi government of Germany,
ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any
person because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion.
Id. (emphasis added).
107. Kulle v. INS, 825 F.2d 1188 (7th Cir. 1987) (decided under 8 U.S.C. §
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eIrced to commit such an act is most likely not exculpatory. 08 The
Board's position could bring about the anomalous result that an indi-
vidual who feared he would be peripherally involved in human rights
abuses committed by the military would be unable to establish eligi-
bility for relief under paragraph 171 as a conscientious objector, but
subsequently would be excludable from relief as a persecutor.
B. In re Canas
1. Rejection of the Handbook
In In re Canas'0 9 the Board chose not to follow the Handbook's
recommendations; in so doing, it abruptly departed from its own pre-
cedent, 110 including In re A-G-"' (in which it had applied the Hand-
book provisions), and from federal precedent." 2 The explanations
given for this break were that the Protocol is silent on this issue, that
the Handbook is not binding, and that its position in the case of the
conscientious objector is ambiguous." 3
First, the Board's reliance on the nonbinding nature of the Hand-
book as a justification for refraining from its application appears dis-
ingenuous. The nonbinding nature of the Handbook has long been
recognized, and at the same time did not preclude the treatise from
serving as an interpretive aid in an unbroken line of cases, including
those involving issues of draft evasion and desertion from the
military."14
1251(a)(19)); Schellong v. INS, 805 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1986) (decided under 8 U.S.C. §
1251(a)(19)).
108. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981) (an individual's service
as a concentration camp armed guard-whether voluntary or involuntary-made him
ineligible as someone who assisted in the persecution of civilians). Fedorenko was de-
cided under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, ch. 647, 62 Stat.
1009. Section 2 of the Displaced Persons Act excluded from refugee status:
1. War criminals, quislings and traitors;
2. Any other person who can be shown:
(a) to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries,
Members of the United Nations; or
(b) to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the outbreak of the
second world war in their operations against the United Nations.
Displaced Persons Act of 1948, supra, at § 2; see also Massey, Individual Responsibility
for Assisting the Nazis in Persecuting Civilians, 71 MINN. L. REV. 97 (1986); United
States v. Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
109. Interim Dec. No. 3074 (BIA 1988).
110. See supra note 26.
111. Interim Dec. No. 3040 (BIA 1987).
112. See supra note 25.
113. Interim Dec. No. 3074, at 10-12.
114. See supra notes 25-26, 47.
Second, the Board's reliance on the silence of the Protocol is mis-
placed. The Protocol defines refugee as any person with a "well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership of a particular social group or political opin-
ion." 115 The Protocol does not provide a substantive interpretation of
the essential terms implicated in the refugee definition. It was for
this very reason that the Handbook was published-to give meaning
to terms not expressly defined within the Protocol." 6 The Handbook
is of most value in those cases where the Protocol's treatment of an
issue is limited. The inference drawn by the Board, that the silence
of the Protocol on an issue diminishes the weight to be accorded the
Handbook, is without authority, and is contrary to the opinion of the
UNHCR itself. 17
The Board's observation that it need not follow the Handbook be-
cause its guidance in this area is ambiguous is equally problematic.
The ambiguity found by the Board consisted of the fact that Hand-
book paragraph 173118 counsels states to consider the increasing in-
ternational trend toward granting the right of conscientious objection
to citizens in determining whether objection to military service for
reasons of conscience should be a basis for granting refugee status.
The Board seized upon the language in the last sentence of the para-
graph, which after discussing this trend, states: "In the light of these
developments, it would be open to Contracting States, to grant refu-
gee status to persons who object to performing military service for
115. See Protocol, supra note 2, art. I.
116. For example, HANDBOOK, supra note 9, %% 51-53, gives meaning to the term
"persecution." This is of great utility since "'[p]ersecution' is not defined in the 1951
Convention or in any other international instrument." G. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 38 (1983). The Handbook outlines circumstances under which
discrimination may rise to the level of persecution, HANDBOOK, supra note 9, 11 54, 55,
or when punishment for a crime may constitute persecution. Id. T 56-60.
117. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner For Refugees, Canas v. INS, No. 88-7444 (9th Cir. 1989) (authored by Guy S.
Goodwin-Gill, Susan Timberlake, Ralph G. Steinhardt) [hereinafter Amicus Curiae
Brief of The UNHCR]. The UNHCR argued:
Of course, as noted by the Board, the 1967 Protocol contains no provision de-
claring that conscientious objectors are per se refugees. But this is not surpris-
ing, since the Protocol offers only a general description of those within its
scope. . . . Significantly, there is no provision in the Protocol that excludes
conscientious objectors-in contrast to war criminals for example-from refu-
gee status. Convention, Article a(f). The Board opines that there was, at the
moment of drafting, no consensus that persons like the applicants [conscien-
tious objectors on account of religious convictions] should qualify. This begs
precisely the question that, in its specificity, the drafters left to be dealt with by
a general definition sufficiently broad to cover persecution in its many forms, if
not its infinite variety. It was error in short for the Board to assume that the
silence of the Protocol with respect to conscientious objection somehow re-
stricted it as a basis for refugee status.
Id. at 13-14 (emphasis added).
118. See supra note 31.
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genuine reasons of conscience." The Board interpreted the phrase
"would be open to Contracting States" as constituting a retreat from
the position set forth in the preceding paragraphs recommending ref-
ugee status for such persons. To the contrary, paragraph 173
strengthens the recommendations of paragraphs 170 through 172 by
emphasizing the growing acceptance of a right to conscientious ob-jection. Once again the Board's interpretation was contrary to the
UNHCR analysis." 9
In choosing not to recognize the relevancy of the Handbook, the
Board in In re Canas was in the unusual position of disagreeing with
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The INS Appellate
Counsel agreed with the respondents on the fundamental legal issue
that religious conscientious objectors may be recognized as refu-
gees. 2° The Board's posture also contradicts the position taken by
the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA)
of the State Department. Pursuant to statute, the BHRHA issues
advisory opinions on applications for political asylum.' Notably, in
119.
Paragraph 173 of the Handbook stresses the need to consider conscientious
objection in the light of recent developments in national laws, in international
bodies, and in the practice of states. Even a cursory review of these develop-
ments will show a trend toward accommodating the individual's right to con-
science within the state's acknowledged right to require military service from
its citizens. But it was error for the Board to link these two inquiries nega-
tively, to deny the possibility that a conscientious objector can be a refugee on
the grounds that international law does not yet require states to recognize con-
scientious objection in their conscription laws ...
Amicus Curiae Brief of the UNHCR, supra note 117, at 21.
120. The appellate counsel stated the following at oral argument:
The basic issue as I would state it, and this is somewhat in the language of the
U.N. Handbook and of the decision, is whether where no alternative to mili-
tary service exists, as is the case in El Salvador, and assuming the religious
conviction of the respondent is reasonably credible. . .a draft evader or a de-
serter may be accorded a grant of asylum. . . .I would think that the Board
could hold that membership in such a sect, a truly devout membership, would
entitle someone to asylum ...
Transcript of oral argument before the Board of Immigration Appeals at 10-13 (Mar. 4,
1988).
121. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(d) (1988) (State Department opinion letters are to be incor-
porated into the record). Favorable State Department letters are rare when dealing with
countries that maintain friendly diplomatic ties with the United States. See Smith, A
Refugee by Any Other Name: An Examination of the Board of Immigration Appeals'
Actions in Asylum Cases, 75 VA. L. REV. 681, 719 (1989) ("Although these opinions are
prepared by the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA), the
BHRHA frequently consults the desk officers for the applicant's native country. The desk
officers are not neutral sources of information on political conditions in the countries to
which they are assigned."); Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 677 n.1 (9th Cir. 1968) ("[a]
frank, but official discussion of the political shortcomings of a friendly nation is not al-
two cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses from El Salvador who fled
to avoid military service, the BHRHA has recommended grants of
asylum.1 22 In at least two other cases where the applicants' alleged
objection to military service was based on religious objections, the
BHRHA affirmed the position of the Handbook, but issued negative
opinions based on its finding that the applicants had not met the
relevant criteria. 23 On other occasions the State Department has ad-
dressed the issue of Salvadoran conscientious objectors by stating
that although the right to an exemption or to noncombatant service
does not exist in law, it does exist in practice.124 There is no evidence
to support this position, 25 but what is valuable about even these let-
ters is the State Department's tacit acceptance of the premise set
forth in the Handbook.
ways compatible with the high duty to maintain advantageous diplomatic relations with
nations throughout the world").
122. A24 343 675, positive advisory opinion (Dec. 12, 1988); A28 960 334, posi-
tive advisory opinion (May 2, 1989). Interestingly, the State Department's advisory opin-
ion in Canas, which was issued August 8, 1985, was negative and conformed to boiler-
plate language; it did not address the conscientious objector basis of the claim.
123. The letters declared:
The applicant believes that he faces persecution because he refuses to serve in
his country's military forces. In countries, such as El Salvador, where military
service is compulsory, failure to perform such service, whether through draft-
evasion or desertion, is usually punishable by law. The penalties vary from
country to country but, if legally imposed, are not normally regarded as perse-
cution. Fear of persecution and punishment for draft evasion or desertion does
not in itself constitute the basis for a well-founded fear of persecution within
the meaning of the Convention and the Protocol. On the other hand, an appli-
cant who is a draft evader or deserter may be considered a refugee, provided it
can be shown that he would suffer disproportionately severe punishment for his
evasion or desertion on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group or political opinion, or it can be demonstrated that
performance of military service would have required his participation in mili-
tary action contrary to his genuine political, religious or moral convictions, or
to valid reasons of conscience.
A27 527 104, advisory letter (May 29, 1986); A26 769 967, advisory letter (Aug. 11,
1986) (emphasis added).
124.
The applicant alleges persecution for refusing to serve in military forces on
religious grounds. The laws of El Salvador do not include conscientious objec-
tion as grounds for exemption from military service nor do such laws include
procedures to obtain alternate service as a non-combatant serviceman or civil-
ian. However, in actual practice, the army attempts to use conscientious objec-
tors in such non-combatant positions as clerks, medics, or cooks, wherever
possible.
A24 732 578, advisory letter (Dec. 22, 1987).
125. In January 1987 then President of El Salvador Jose Napolean Duarte pro-
posed a law that would have assigned recruits who, "for religious reasons," could not
carry arms to "special units" designated by the High Command. The proposed law also
would have exempted only sons, school teachers, and pastors, among others, from mili-
tary service, and would be applied to all Salvadorans "without regard to sex, class or
condition." This law was never passed. See Lindsay-Poland, Youth Under Fire: Military
Conscription in El Salvador (publication forthcoming as a special report by the Center
on War and the Child).
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The Board's decision not to defer to the Handbook in In re Canas
is unsupported by precedent. In addition, it contradicts the position
held by the Department of State and the INS Appellate Counsel.
2. The Board's Analysis of Persecution On Account of
Religion
After ruling that it was not bound to follow the Handbook recom-
mendations, the Board in In re Canas analyzed the respondents'
claim under the 1980 Refugee Act. It did not address whether the
type of harm the respondents feared was persecution, but moved di-
rectly to the question of causal relationship: is the harm imposed on
account of one of the five enumerated grounds?
The respondents had alleged" two distinct types of
harms-prosecution and punishment for their refusal to perform mil-
itary service contrary to their religious beliefs, and extrajudicial
sanctions for the political opinion imputed to them as a result of
their refusal to serve. The Board ruled that the respondents had not
established a likelihood of extrajudicial sanctions; it thus limited its
analysis to whether prosecution and punishment of Jehovah's Wit-
nesses for refusal to serve in the military constitutes persecution on
account of religion.
The Board held that prosecution and punishment under these cir-
cumstances does not constitute persecution on account of religion. It
reached this conclusion by applying a constricted analysis of the "on
account of religion" requirement. The Board focused solely on the
motivations of the government, and ignored the effect of the govern-
ment's sanctions on the individual's religious practices. The Board
conceded that the respondents were being punished for adhering to
their religious beliefs. However, the Board reasoned, the govern-
ment's motivation was not to punish them for holding these beliefs,
but for the offense of refusing to comply with the conscription law.
Therefore, the Board concluded that such punishment does not con-
stitute persecution on account of religion. 26
The analytical framework thus conceived by the Board calls into
question the promise of protection from religious persecution con-
tained within the Protocol and the 1980 Refugee Act. The exclusive
126. The opposite conclusion has been reached by the State Department, which
found religious persecution to exist in Hungary because of the imprisonment of conscien-
tious objectors. OFFICE OF ASYLUM AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANI-
TARIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION IN HUNGARY
(1988).
focus on the purported motivations of the government in enforcing
conscription is overly restrictive. In this case, enforcement of the
conscription law denies the individual the power to make the most
fundamental decision-whether to participate in a war and engage
in killing another human being. The locus of the Board's inquiry is
misplaced; it errs in considering as irrelevant the effect of the law
and looking only at the motivations of the government.
Case law on persecution on account of religion arising under the
1980 Refugee Act is scant, and does not address the issue raised by
the Board's analysis.' 27 Thus, it is instructive to consult other sources
and authorities to develop the meaning of persecution on account of
religion. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares: "Ev-
eryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion"
and this right includes the "freedom to change religion or belief, and
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, wor-
ship and observance. 1 28 This broad statement provides a more ap-
propriate basis for discussion and assessment of the parameters of
persecution on account of religion. A finding of persecution must
look both at the protected religious interest at stake, as well as the
government's motivation; a more limited analysis transforms the
right to practice one's religion into a mere formality.129
127. The motivation of the persecutor was not an issue in a sampling of cases
alleging, inter alia, persecution on account of religion. Gumbol v. INS, 815 F.2d 406
(6th Cir. 1987); Yousif v. INS, 794 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1986); Dawood-Haio v. INS, 800
F.2d 90 (6th Cir. 1986); Shamon v. INS, 735 F.2d 1015 (6th Cir. 1984); Nasser v. INS,
744 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1984); Dally v. INS, 744 F.2d 1191 (6th Cir. 1984); Youkhanna
v. INS, 749 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1984); In re Salama, I II. & N. Dec. 536 (BIA 1966); In
re Liadakis, 10 I. & N. Dec. 252 (BIA 1963).
128. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 18, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc.
A/810, at 71 (1948).
129. The Ninth Circuit has held that it could analyze the "on account of" require-
ment from either the victim or the persecutor's perspective. Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813
F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987) (persecution on account of political opinion found in
case in which Salvadoran Army sergeant Zuniga repeatedly raped and beat civilian wo-
man, Olimpia, because Zuniga had the political opinion "that a man has the right to
dominate" a woman, and Olimpia had the political opinion that "no political control
exists to restrain a brutal sergeant"); Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th
Cir. 1985) ("in determining whether threats of violence constitute political persecu-
tion. . .we may look to the political views and actions of the [persecutor] as well as to
the victim's and we may examine the relationship between the two").
This analytical flexibility was also demonstrated in a policy guideline issued by former
Attorney General Edwin Meese regarding asylum for nationals of the People's Republic
of China. Meese stated that a refusal to follow the family planning policy of "one-child
per couple" based on reasons of conscience should be viewed as an act of political defi-
ance sufficient to establish refugee status. Office of the Attorney General, Memorandum
to INS Commissioner Alan Nelson, Aug. 1988, reprinted in the AM. IMMIGN. LAW.
Ass'N NEWSL., (Nov. 1988). The Board rejected the Meese guidelines in In re Jin Han
Chang, A27 202 715, Interim Dec. No. 3107 (May 12, 1989). "We cannot find that
implementation of the 'one couple, one child' policy in and of itself, even to the extent
that involuntary sterilizations may occur, is persecution or creates a well-founded fear of
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Finally, in ruling that the punishment of the Canas brothers does
not constitute persecution, the Board also relied heavily on the fact
that the Salvadoran conscription law applies to all individuals
equally, regardless of their religious affiliation. An analogy to domes-
tic first amendment law illustrates the problematic nature of such an
analysis; it has long been recognized that application of a neutral
statute may improperly burden the religious freedoms of some indi-
viduals. 130 Under these circumstances, to argue that equal treatment
defeats a claim of persecution is illogical; it is comparing "like with
unlike."'' Where, on the one hand, the state may be justified in
punishing a "mere" draft evader or deserter, different values must be
balanced in justifying the punishment of a resister of conscience.
V. THE DEVELOPING TREND TOWARD RECOGNITION OF
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AS A FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT
The decision to confer refugee status on conscientious objectors
should be informed by domestic and international norms. Decisions
such as In re Canas and In re A-G- must be considered in light of
the standards of civilized nations. The right to conscientious objec-
persecution 'on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.'" Id. at 7.
130. United States domestic law arising under the first amendment free exercise
clause is useful by analogy for its recognition that neutral statutes can have a differential
impact on individuals depending on their religious affiliations and beliefs. The fact that
no discriminatory impact was intended is insufficient to defeat a claim of interference
with the free exercise of religion. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 408 U.S.
136 (1987) (reaffirming Sherbert); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (Jeho-
vah's Witness who, for religious reasons, quit his job in a weapons plant, was entitled to
unemployment benefits); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) ("[a] regulation
neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional require-
ment for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion");
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (Seventh Day Adventist who, for religious rea-
sons, refused to work on Saturdays, was entitled to unemployment benefits).
131.
To rely on the "fact" that the respondents face punishment just as any other
Salvadoran who refused military service is to compare like with unlike. The
respondents do not claim to be "like any other," but to be particular in the
sense of motivated by conscience, and thereby moved into the arena of political
conflict. In this sense, they may not be persecuted "on account of" their reli-
gion, but in spite of it. In effect, they are persecuted because their religious
conviction sets them in a political context, in which the extent of state author-
ity and individual autonomy are at issue. A failure to accommodate such indi-
viduals in accordance with standards of reasonableness and proportionality, or
otherwise to accord protection from risk of harm, amounts to persecution.
Amicus Curiae Brief of the UNHCR, supra note 117, at 16-17.
tion has long been recognized in the United States,'32 and there is an
emerging trend toward its recognition as a fundamental human
right. 3
The international trend may be seen as a natural outgrowth of the
right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion which is con-
tained in numerous treaties, including the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights,3 the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,' 35 the American Convention on Human Rights,3 6 and the
132. The tradition of conscientious objection is rooted in the early colonial period
in the United States. In 1661 Massachusetts enacted the first legal provision allowing
conscientious objection. To a great degree, this was the result of the influence of Quaker
and Mennonite settlers. Universal conscription laws enacted in the twentieth century
have all contained provisions for conscientious objection to military service. The earliest
conscription law of the 1900s limited exemption to members of "peace churches," those
religions which required abstention from all military service. Act of May 18, 1917, ch.
154, 40 Stat. 78 (repealed 1919). The current statute, as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court, provides exemption for those individuals who object to participa-
tion in all wars as a result of religious, moral, or ethical beliefs, and is thus significantly
broader than the earlier enactment. See Military Selective Service Act § 6(j), 50
U.S.C.A. app. 456 (j) (West 1981); 32 C.F.R. 1636.3-1636.6 (1989); Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). For an
historical and philosophical discussion of conscientious objection in the United States, see
S. KOIN, JAILED FOR PEACE: THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN DRAFT LAW VIOLATORS 1658-
1985 (1986).
133. Discussion of the international trend toward recognition of conscientious ob-
jection as a fundamental human right is drawn primarily from the excellent discussion of
the same contained in Amicus Curiae Brief of the UNHCR, supra note 117.
134. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares: "Everyone
has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom
to change religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and
observance." G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
135. Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
declares:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and reli-
gion. This right shall include freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of
his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, prac-
tice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety,
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
4. The State Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for
the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the reli-
gious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own
convictions.
G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 55, U.N. Doc. A/6316 1966,
(entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
136. Article 12 of the American Convention on Human Rights declares:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience and of religion. This right
includes freedom to maintain or to change one's religion or beliefs, and free-
dom to profess or disseminate one's religion or beliefs either individually or
together with others, in public or in private.
2. No one shall be subject to restrictions that might impair his freedom to
[VOL. 26: 849, 1989] Refuge for Conscientious Objectors
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms. 37
In March 1989, after more than a decade of consideration and
study,138 the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations
adopted a resolution recognizing the right to conscientious objection
as "a legitimate exercise of the right of freedom of thought, con-
science and religion." The resolution appeals to states to provide for
alternative service.
The Council of Europe has dealt with the question of conscien-
tious objection in a manner similar to the United Nations. In April
1987 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe made the
recommendation that "[a]nyone. . .who, for compelling reasons of
conscience, refuses to be involved in the use of arms, shall have the
right to be released from the obligation to perform such service ...
maintain or to change his religion or beliefs.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion and beliefs may be subject only to the
limitations prescribed by law that are necessary to protect public safety, order,
health or morals, or the rights or freedoms of others.
4. Parents or guardians, as the case may be, have the right to provide for the
religious and moral education of their children or wards that is in accord with
their own convictions.
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Doc.OEA/Ser.L/V/
11.65, Doc. 6 (1985) (entered into force July 18, 1978).
137. Article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms declares:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and the freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, Nov. 4, 1953).
138. In 1971, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights began to investi-
gate the issue of conscientious objection in connection with its Study of Discrimination
in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices. The'Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities continued the inquiry, preparing first a pre-
liminary report, and then a final report in 1983, entitled CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION TO
MILITARY SERVICE, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/30/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No.
E.85.XIV.I (1985). On March 10, 1987, the Commission on Human Rights passed a
resolution appealing to states to recognize conscientious objection as a legitimate exercise
of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Res. 1987/46. In 1987, the
Commission on Human Rights requested the Secretary-General to report to its forty-fifth
session on the question of conscientious objection. In March 1989, the Commission on
Human Rights adopted a resolution formally and expressly recognizing the right to con-
scientious objection. Draft Report of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/L.10/Add.15 (1989).
Such persons may be liable to perform alternative service.' 13 9
Although the recognition of the right to conscientious objection as
a fundamental human right is by no means a requisite for accept-
ance of the Handbook provisions, it is significant for its expression of
an enlightened trend, a trend which should inform the implementa-
tion of the 1980 Refugee Act.
VI. THE SALVADORAN AND GUATEMALAN CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTOR: HOW TO MEET THE HANDBOOK CRITERIA
The Board of Immigration Appeals has declined to grant asylum
to young men from El Salvador and Guatemala who refuse to par-
ticipate in the military for reasons of conscience. Nonetheless, until
the federal courts speak on this issue, it is premature to abandon this
theory on behalf of asylum seekers. Attorneys representing young
men who express an aversion to military service should inquire into
the underlying reasons. In cases where the applicant refused military
service due to genuine religious, political, or moral convictions, or
valid reasons of conscience, a claim may lie. The record should set
forth the essential elements of the claim-the genuineness of the re-
spondent's convictions, and the form of military participation re-
quired-to preserve the issue for appeal.
A. The Form of Military Participation
A claim for asylum arising under the Handbook must establish:
(1) mandatory conscription; (2) no exemption for reasons of con-
science; (3) judicial sanctions; and (4) condemnation of the military
action by the international community (in the case of the individual
whose objection is based on political convictions). Both El Salvador
and Guatemala meet these criteria.
1. El Salvador
As previously noted, Article 15 of the Salvadoran Constitution
states that military service is obligatory for all men between the ages
of eighteen and thirty. 4 ' The Salvadoran Constitution further states
that a secondary law will be passed to regulate military service, but
to this date no such secondary law has been enacted. Although there
are written procedures requiring young men to report for military
duty,'41 the actual practice is one of forcible recruitment affecting
139. Recommendation of the Comm. of Ministers, Doc. No. R(87)8 (Apr. 9,
1987).
140. CONSTITUCION art. 215 (El Sal.).
141. REGLAMENTO PARA LA ORGANIZACION DE LAS SITUACIONES ACTIVA,
RESERVA Y RESERVA TERRITORIAL DEL EJERCITO (Regulation for the Organization of
Active, Reserve and Territorial Reserve Status of the Army) (Oct. 6, 1933). According
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primarily the sons of the poor.142 The roundups of young men on the
streets often result in the recruitment of teen-age boys well below the
legal age of recruitment. 143 Salvadoran law does not recognize con-
scientious objection as a valid ground for refusing military service,
and draft resisters are punished as deserters. 144 Because E! Salvador
is currently at war, the crime of desertion is aggravated and carries a
penalty of five to fifteen years.145 There have been repeated state-
ments of severe censure regarding the conduct of the war, which
may be cited to establish condemnation by the international
community.14 6
to the Regulation, young men are to report to the military unit nearest their home during
the first five days of January each year. Local boards, along with the assistance of town
mayors, are to prepare listings of those to be inducted.
142. Salvador Army Fills Ranks by Force, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1989, at A3, col.
2 ("But while the poor fight, bleed and die for a system dominated by the economic elite,
most wealthy young Salvadorans avoid military service. The Army allows well-to-do
youths to buy their way out of the service, and the military almost never forcibly recruits
soldiers in wealthy neighborhoods."); After Parades and Promises, Duarte Flounders in
El Salvador, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1987, § 1, at 7, col. 2 ("The sons of the rich are safe
because there is no draft and the army press gangs do not pick up young men in affluent
neighborhoods .. ").
143. Salvador Army Fills Ranks by Force, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1989, at A3, col.
1 ("The 57,000-man Salvadoran military forcibly enlists 12,000 a year, often snatching
teen-agers as young as 14 from poor and rural families.").
The recruitment of persons under the age of fifteen is in violation of Protocols I and II
of the Geneva Convention. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
(Protocol I), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, art. 7, para. 2, reprinted in 16 INT'L.
LEGAL MATERIALS 1391, 1425 (1977); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
1949 (Protocol II), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, art. 4, para. 3(c), reprinted in 16
I.L.M. 1442, 1444 (1977).
Although a government may have the right to conscript its citizens, the recruitment of
underage children in violation of international instruments as well as internal regulations,
as in the case of El Salvador, is without legitimacy, and may form the basis of a claim
for asylum independent of any claim of refusal based on reasons of conscience. See In re
Roberto Antonio Campos, A29 560 623 (San Francisco Immigration Court) (asylum
granted on May 9, 1989 to a Salvadoran boy who wis forcibly recruited at age 15; IJ
held that forced recruitment of underage individual constituted kidnapping).
144. Conscientious Objection to Military Service, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2, at
23, 26, 28, U.N. Sales No. E.85.XIV.1 (1985).
145. CODIGO DE JUSTICE MILITAR, supra note 92, arts. 137-39.
146. See G.A. Res. 43/145, 43 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) (forthcoming); U.N.
Doc. A/RES/43/145 (1989); G.A. Res. 42/137, 42 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.49) at 228,
U.N. Doc. A/42/49 (1987); G.A. Res. 41/157, 41 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 205,
U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986). The most recent of these resolutions, dated December 8,
1988, noted that "there has been an increase in the number of violations of human rights
in El Salvador, particularly in the form of threats to human life and integrity [and]
frequent violations of the humanitarian rules of war .. " G.A. Res. 43/145, supra.
2. Guatemala
Two forms of mandatory service exist in Guatemala-regular mil-
itary units and civil patrol units. The civil patrols were formed as
part of the Guatemalan government's response to the armed opposi-
tion movement. Service in the military is obligatory for all men over
the age of eighteen.14 The law requires voluntary enlistment; in re-
ality, forced recruitment similar to recruitment in El Salvador is the
norm. 148 There is no exemption for conscientious objectors, who may
be imprisoned.14 9 Service in the civil patrol is mandatory for all Gua-
temalan males between the ages of eighteen and fifty.15 In contrast
to military service, which has juridical legitimacy, there is no statu-
tory basis, executive order, or edict for the civil patrol,151 and obliga-
tory service, in fact, violates the Guatemalan Constitution. 15 2 There
is substantial evidence of the imposition of extrajudicial sanctions
against individuals refusing to participate in the civil patrols,' 53 and
a new human rights organization, Runujel Junam Council of Ethnic
Communities, 5 4 has been established in Guatemala to support those
147. CONSTITUCION art. 135 (Guat.) (it is the duty of every Guatemalan citizen
"to give the military and social service in accordance with the law"); see also LEY CON-
STITUTIVA DEL EJERCITO DE GUATEMALA (Constitutive Law of the Guatemalan Army),
ch. 9, art. 65 ("All Guatemalan males, on reaching 18 years of age, have the obligation
to sign themselves up as soldiers in order to obtain their record of enrollment in the
military. . . ."); Letter from Rubens Medina, Chief of the Library of Congress, His-
panic Law Division, to the Honorable Ronald V. Dellums (with a Report by Gisela von
Muhlenbrock, Senior Legal Specialist, with Appendices) (Apr. 7, 1986) ("all male
Guatemalans 18 years of age must register for mandatory military service") [hereinafter
Medina Letter].
148. J. SIMON, GUATEMALA: ETERNAL SPRING, ETERNAL TYRANNY 45-46 (1988).
Military service is obligatory for all Guatemalan males, yet poor Indian males are the
primary targets of forced recruitment. The army conducts forced recruitment drives
wherever it finds large gatherings of young males.
149. Conscientious Objection to Military Service, supra note 144, at 20, 24, 27,
28; Medina Letter, supra note 147 ("[M]ilitary service is mandatory in Guatemala and
those who do not register or who dodge the draft are penalized. The law does not include
conscientious objection as an exemption from serving in the armed forces.").
150. The official age and gender limitations are ignored, and it is common for mi-
nors, as well as females to be forced to patrol. AMERICAS WATCH, CIVIL PATROLS IN
GUATEMALA 38-40 (1986).
151. Medina Letter, supra note 147 ("The civil defense patrols do not have a spe-
cific statutory basis and are the product of internal warfare in that country.").
152. CONSTITUCION art. 5 (Guat.) (Guatemalan citizens are not required to obey
orders "not" based on the law or issued according to it); id. art. 34 (no one is mandated
to become associated or to become a member of self-defense or similar groups or
associations).
153. See, e.g., AMERICAS WATCH, CLOSING THE SPACE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN GUA-
TEMALA, MAY 1987-OCTOBER 1988, at 76-79, (1988); AMERICAS WATCH, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN GUATEMALA DURING PRESIDENT CEREZO'S FIRST YEAR 48 (1987); AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, GUATEMALA: THE HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD 98-100 (1987).
154. Consejo de Comunidades Etnicas Runujel Junam (CERJ) was founded by
school teacher Amilcar Mendez Urizar on July 31, 1988. The purpose of the organiza-
tion is to document threats and violence against individuals who have withdrawn from
the civil patrol. CERJ presented a petition to the Guatemalan Human Rights Commis-
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individuals who assert their constitutional right to refuse service in
the patrols. Many human rights organizations have gone on record
condemning the ongoing pattern of human rights abuses committed
by the military and the civil patrol in Guatemala.' 55
B. "Genuine Convictions"
The genuineness of an individual's convictions is a question of
credibility. It can be established by detailed, consistent, and articu-
late testimony by the applicant.5 6 Credibility can be adversely af-
fected by factors peculiar to the asylum process; attorneys who re-
present refugees have increasingly become aware of ways in which
cultural differences' 5 7 and psychological trauma can result in disbe-
lief of the client's testimony."'
Developing client testimony in this area requires sensitivity to the
sophistication level of the asylum applicant. The genuineness of be-
liefs of a Salvadoran peasant or Guatemalan Indian with little or no
education may be established notwithstanding the client's inability to
discuss their ideas as formal theological, philosophical, or ethical po-
sitions. A Catholic client who believes with all his heart in the bibli-
cal commandant "thou shalt not kill" and bases the refusal to serve
on this alone, is just as credible as an individual who can explain the
official Catholic theology supporting the position of conscientious ob-
jection. Details about the development and deepening of belief of the
less sophisticated client will contribute to credibility. Many clients
will be able to recall their earliest church attendance, their training
sion, the government Human Rights Attorney, and the president of the Supreme Court
to force compliance with the constitutional ban on forced civil patrol participation. As a
result of his work, Mendez has received numerous death threats. See Amnesty Interna-
tional Announcement, Death Threats Against a Human Rights Activist from Quiche
(Nov. 1, 1988).
155. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 40/140, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 249, U.N.
Doc. A/40/53 (1985) (expressing concern at "the widespread suffering caused by disre-
gard for the principles of international humanitarian law applicable to [the conflict in
Guatemala]"); G.A. Res. 37/184, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 204, U.N. Doc. A/
37/51 (1983); see also, 12TH ANNUAL COHA COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS RE-
PORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA (Dec. 25, 1988) (naming Guatemala as the
"hemisphere's worst human rights violator").
156. See McGrath, Credibility Determinations: Avoiding Adverse Findings in
Asylum Hearings and Defeating them on Appeal, 16 IMMIGR. NEWSL. (July-Aug. 1987).
157. See V. KOT, THE IMPACT OF CULTURAL FACTORS ON CREDIBILITY IN THE
ASYLUM CONTEXT (1988); Kalin, Troubled Communication: Cross-Cultural Misunder-
standings in the Asylum Hearing, 20 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 230 (1986).
158. See POLITICAL ASYLUM: A HANDBOOK FOR LEGAL AND MENTAL HEALTH
WORKERS (1987).
in scriptural commandments, their communion (if Catholic), and the
effect that particular priests, ministers, or catechists had on the for-
mation of their thinking in this area. Testimony should also address
their current beliefs and religious affiliation.
It is equally important for the attorney to understand the precepts
of the client's religion, when the claim is so based. An individual
may belong to a religion which prohibits military service under all
circumstances. For example, religions such as the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses, the Quakers, and the Church of the Brethren (Amish) re-
quire abstention from military service as a central tenet of their reli-
gion. In contrast, other religions accept the concept of "selective
conscientious objection," wherein an individual may object to partic-
ular wars on moral grounds, but may participate in other military
actions, depending on the circumstances. Within Catholic theology,
there is an explicit theological basis for selective conscientious objec-
tion: under the "just war" tradition, a Catholic should abstain from
military service when the ends being pursued or the means being
used are not morally justifiable.159 There also exists within Catholic
theology a pacifist tradition of opposition to all war, which is well
supported by both historical and contemporary church documents.1, 0
An individual's assertion that his religion will not allow him to
participate in military action must be assessed in the light of the
tenets of his religion,161 and in light of his own personal interpreta-
tion of his religion. A Jehovah's Witness and a Catholic might each
testify that their religion absolutely prohibits participation in war;
the Jehovah's Witness would be basing his position on an express
tenet of the religion, while the Catholic would be basing it upon his
interpretation of the biblical commandment "thou shalt nut kill."
Furthermore, there may be distinctions between the types of war-
related activities to which an individual objects. Some men may state
they would be willing to take a noncombatant role because this
would not violate the prohibition against killing, while others may
find that any assisting role is complicit and makes them morally cul-
159. The "just war" theory originated in the theology of St. Augustine and St.
Thomas Aquinas. Two sets of criteria must be satisfied for a conflict to be considered
under the just war theory. The first is referred to as jus ad bello, which determines when
recourse to war is legitimate; the second is jus in bello, which addresses the means by
which a war may be morally pursued. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISH-
OPS. THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE: GOD'S PROMISE AND OUR RESPONSE, A PASTORAL LET-
TER OF WAR AND PEACE 26-34 (1983).
160. The Catholic pacifist tradition is rooted in the life of Jesus and the early
Christian communities; it places an absolute value on human life, and embraces nonvi-
olence. Id. at 34-35.
161. See NATIONAL INTERRELIGIOUS SERVICE BOARD FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJEC-
TORS, WORDS OF CONSCIENCE: RELIGIOUS STATEMENTS ON CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
(10th ed. 1983) for a compilation of the official position on conscientious objection of
major world faiths.
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pable for the war dead. Further distinctions flowing from personal
interpretations may emerge. For example, a Jehovah's Witness, al-
though objecting to all military participation, might not object to the
use of force for self-defense, while a Catholic, who defines himself as
a pacifist, may abstain from the use of force under all circumstances.
Effective representation requires that the attorney understand the
basis and parameters of the client's beliefs so that he or she can
prepare the client for adversarial hypotheticals during cross-exami-
nation which challenge the theological consistency and sincerity of
the religious convictions. It may be helpful for a minister or priest to
discuss the precepts of the religion with the client and subsequently
submit an affidavit evaluating the sincerity of the conviction.
VII. CONCLUSION
The enactment of the 1980 Refugee Act was widely applauded as
a step toward fulfillment of the United States obligations undertaken
pursuant to the Protocol. The question of asylum for the conscien-
tious objector presents a challenge to the United States commitment
to humanitarian ideals expressed by the 1980 Refugee Act.62 Rec-
ognition of conscientious objectors as refugees does not require aban-
donment of domestic precedent. To the contrary, the developing pre-
cedent supports a definition of refugee which includes individuals
who would be imprisoned for adhering to their religious, political, or
moral convictions.
The issue has far-reaching implications; the United States is per-
ceived as a leader, and its decisions broadly influence the refugee
policy of other nations .'6 3 The recognition of conscientious objectors
162. This sentiment is articulated in the legislative history of the Refugee Act:
"The Refugee Act. . .reflects one of the oldest themes in America's history-welcoming
homeless refugees to our shores. It gives statutory meaning to our national commitment
to human rights and humanitarian concerns .. " S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 141.
163. A 1986 issue paper of the U.S. Committee for Refugees recognized the lead-
ership role of the United States in refugee issues:
In a 1982 draft internal report on asylum adjudications, INS recognized the
pivotal role of the United States: "As with other issues, the United States is
called upon to play a leadership role, for not only will our policies and decisions
impact on the people of our own nation but they will serve as the international
standard by which many other Western nations will evaluate their own ac-
tions." It is not only Western nations who will note the conduct of the United
States toward asylum seekers. In Southeast Asia, in Africa, in Pakistan, where
millions have found refuge, U.S. standards will not be ignored.
U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, DESPITE A GENEROUS SPIRIT: DENYING ASYLUM IN THE
UNITED STATES (1986).
as refugees would demonstrate the United States continuing commit-
ment to the international refugee definition. In addition, it would sig-
nal to the international community that the United States values the
individual conscience, is committed to the protection of religious
freedom, and is in step with the trend toward recognition of consci-
entious objection as a fundamental human right.
